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Abstract
The de-bundling and re-bundling of service products offered by low cost carriers from service
innovation have become ’à-la-carte’ services and chargeable ancillary services to generate
additional revenues in the airline industry. In this paper, we focus on the payable upgrade
option in airlines to increase revenue when customers’ demands are uncertain. This study is
as an extension of planned upgrade, which guarantees the use of low-quality services at a low
price, but requires customers to pay to use upgraded benefits. In this paper, we focus on the
seat assignment problem with the payable upgrade option to maximize revenue. Also, we set
the condition under which payable upgrade options can generate more revenue. Furthermore,
applying Belobaba’s EMSR approach, we suggest an effective seat assignment method for
multiple fare classes with a payable upgrade option to increase the total revenue. With a
simple numerical example, we find that introducing a payable upgrade option can increase
the revenue. Our method for allocating seats for multiple fare classes with a payable upgrade
option can contribute effectively to revenue increases in airlines’ branded fare products, as
well as in other service industries.
Keywords Option products · Payable upgrade · Seat assignment · Revenue management ·
Ancillary revenue
1 Introduction
Deregulation and the advent of low-cost carriers (LCCs) during the past decades have acceler-
ated the serious competition among airlines. Airlines are offering their customers innovative
services to improve their competitiveness and profits. Traditionally, airlines increase their
revenue by applying complicated revenue management (RM) models and systems. RM in
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tickets, which are perishable products whose values become zero if they are not consumed
within a certain time period (Chiu et al., 2017; Feng et al., 2021; Qin et al., 2020). Recently,
the de-bundling and re-bundling of service products offered by LCCs have become ’à-la-
carte’ services and chargeable ancillary services to generate additional revenues. Ancillary
revenues are recognized as an important revenue source for both LCCs and traditional full-
service carriers (FSCs).
It is very important to respond effectively to the uncertainty of future demands for a
perishable product in order to maximise revenues. Gallego et al. (2008) suggested several
mechanisms to overcome the future demand uncertainties in the airline industry: standbys,
bumping, the re-plane concept, flexible products, last-minute discounts, and auctions. How-
ever, none of them is perfect to maximize the revenues of airlines. Some (standbys and
bumped passengers) add operational complexities, some require additional processes from
customers, and some may reduce customer convenience.
Numerous RM models have been widely used in the airline industry to improve financial
performance in recent decades, but most of them have low forecasting accuracy due to
uncertain future demands (Gallego et al., 2008). In particular, seats protected from the low
fare demand for high fare products frequently become empty or insufficient and airlines lose
the opportunity to get more revenue. There are many studies on RM, and comprehensive
reviews on revenue management problems can be found in Feng et al. (2015), Talluri and van
Ryzin (2004) andMcGill and van Ryzin (1999). Although airlines have been able to increase
revenues by using those RM techniques, they have struggled to make profit for decades and
the development of new services to increase their revenues is pivotal for their sustainability.
In this paper, we suggest an innovative product, called the payable upgrade option. This
product allows customers to buy an upgrade option at additional cost when they buy one of
multiple products with different prices. The upgrade option guarantees the use of higher fare
products depending on their availability at the time. If there is no availability, the airlines
recall the upgrade option and customers are paid compensation. In this case, they can simply
use the lower fare products that they originally bought. The new product creates value for
both customers and airlines, as customers can buy high fare products at a lower price, while
airlines can create additional revenue if the demand for the high fare products is lower than
expected.
The payable upgrade option is similar to the call option or callable product (Gallego et al.,
2008) that is widely used in the airline industry. Airlines sell some flight tickets with call
options to respond to uncertain future demands. A callable flight ticket can be recalled by
an airline at some point in the future before the departure time if the demand for higher fare
tickets is high: therefore, the airline can increase its revenue. Customers whose tickets are
recalled by the airline need to give up these tickets, with compensation that is higher than
the original price. Callable products are attractive to customers whose flight schedules are
flexible, as they can use higher fare seats with lower prices, while airlines can resell these
tickets at higher prices if demand for seats on a flight suddenly increases. Similar to callable
productions, the payable upgrade option product requires customers to purchase a lower fare
product and the upgrade option as well. Once the upgrade option is recalled by an airline,
customers receive compensation for this option and use the original product. Otherwise,
customers can use the higher fare product at the lower fare and pay a fee to upgrade. Our
study is an extension of planned upgrade that guarantees the use of services with a low quality
at a low price; however, customers are required to pay to use the upgrade benefit in this case.
In this paper, we concentrate on the seat assignment problemwith the payable upgrade option
to maximize airlines’ revenues.
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The organization of the paper is as follows. We review existing ancillary services in the
airline industry in the next section. The main focus is to highlight the novelty of the new
service proposed in this paper. Then, we define a capacity allocation model with a payable
upgrade option that is illustrated using numerical examples. We discuss the implications of
the findings of the study and conclude.
2 Revenuemanagementmodels in the airline industry
There have been two types of development with regard to chargeable ancillary services
for RM in the airline industry. One is the de-bundling of products, which is developed via
decomposing existing full services. The other is developing new products by re-designing
the business processes.
The à-la-carte service and branded fare products (Vinod & Moore, 2009) in airlines are
examples of the former. Air New Zealand introduced the first brand fare products in 2004 and
since then numerous airlines have offered similar products. In this scheme, airlines bundle
elements, such as pre-reserved seats, the amount of frequent flyer miles, lounge access,
baggage limits and so on, into the base fares. For example, British Airways offers four
different products including Economy, Premium Economy, Business/Club, and First Class
tickets that have different compositions of ancillary services depending on their privileges.
A flexible service is a product developed by redesigning business processes. There are
many types of flexible services that are proposed in various forms depending on the scope of
rights in the transaction processes between airlines and customers. For example, the purchase
delay option allows a delay of payment after a reservation. Aydin et al. (2016) developed
an RM model with commitment options, which allow a time delay to make payments after
ticket reservations. The callable or call-back option, the buy-back option, and the upgrade
option are examples of flexible services in the airline industry and play a significant role in
increasing revenues.
Callable products have been developed to reduce inventories due to market uncertainty in
the airline industry (Sheffi, 2005). Call-back is a simple concept in airlines. Callable flight
tickets can be recalled by airlines at some point in the future before the departure time.
Customers whose tickets are recalled need to give up these tickets and are compensated by
the airline with pre-specified prices (which are of course higher than the original prices). If
the airline does not recall the tickets, customers can use them as normal. Customers whose
flight schedules are flexible would choose callable tickets for potential profit, while airlines
can resell these tickets at higher prices if demand suddenly increases. Gallego et al. (2008)
reveal that callable products are more effective for high-fare customers. Also, they show that
airlines can increase their revenues from selling any or all flight tickets in combination with
callable products. This is also called the "call-back" option (Li et al., 2016).
A similar idea to callable products is "buy back", which is an option by airlines to re-
purchase already sold passenger tickets (Lardeux et al., 2018). Once airlines re-purchase
tickets from their customers, their reservations are cancelled, and the seats can be sold to
customerswho arewilling to pay the higher prices. In the buy-back option, customers have the
choice to accept or reject re-call offers. The buy-back option differs from the callable product
in that customers can reject the recall offer. IT solutions supporting buy-back options have
been launched recently in practice (Avisell, 2018; Caravelo, 2017; TransferTravel, 2017).
Elmaghraby et al. (2009) address a case in which a service provider offers both callable
and non-callable products with different prices at different times. The provider announces
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that the product will be sold at the discounted price if there are any left after the sale at
the regular price by the specific time. In that case, two operating schemes are considered:
"No Reservation" and "With Reservation". They show that the reservation option enables the
service provider to have a "back-up" demand if the demand at the regular price is not enough.
Upgrading allows customers who have purchased lower fare products to use higher fare
products without extra costs. This is expected to improve companies’ profitability in the
presence of demand uncertainty by increasing customer loyalty. There are two types of
upgrading scheme: full cascading and limited cascading. Full cascading allows upgrades to
any higher fare products, while limited cascading restricts upgrades only to the next highest
band product. Alstrup et al. (1986) and Karaesmen and van Ryzin addressed overbooking
problemswith upgrades anddowngrades. ShumskyandZhang (2009) developed an integrated
approach of capacity control with planned upgrades based on protection limits. Steinhardt
and Gösch (2012) and Gönsch et al. (2013) focused on a capacity control problem with
upgrades in the rental car industry.
The payable upgrade option proposed in this paper is different from the call option, as
customerswho have bought the upgrade option can still use their original lower band products
even if the upgrade option is recalled by airlines. On the other hand, customers who have
bought callable options are not able to travel if their tickets are recalled. The upgrade option
is also different from airlines’ upgrading practice, as customers are paying smaller fees for
the option to ensure a certain level of guarantee of upgrading. On the other hand, upgrading is
random and customers do not have any control over receiving the service. From the airlines’
perspective, a payable upgrade option is more attractive than upgrading, as they can increase
revenues from the fee attached to the service when demands for higher band services are low.
3 Capacity allocationmodels with recall options
Airlines offer several booking classes to respond to uncertain demands. Each booking class
has a different constraint on conditions for cancellation, changes, and service levels. Cus-
tomers prefer to buy a flight ticket with few restrictions at a low price. However, airlines
sell flight tickets with fewer restrictions at higher prices. The lower-class tickets, which are
sold for the lower prices, usually have stricter restrictions on the ability to make changes or
cancellations, as well as lower service quality. The payable upgrade products meet the needs
of customers whowish to buy a low band ticket and then consider other options for upgrading
the ticket with additional cost.
We define the following notations to model the airlines’ decision problem for the payable
upgrade option.
N, Q The number of fare types and the total capacity respectively,
ri Fare of fare class i (r1 > r2 > · · · > rN ),
Di Demand for fare class i having the mean Di , and the variance σ 2i ,
zi Sale amount of upgrade option for fare class i,
i Number of upgrade options recalled for fare class i,
gi Upgrade option price,
hi Compensation for the recall for fare class i,
xi Number of seats assigned for fare class i,
Si (xi ) Number of seats sold for fare class i, once the number of seats is assigned at xi ,
Ri (xi ) Revenue for fare class i from the assigned seats xi ,
R(Q) The total revenue with the capacity Q.
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Fig. 1 The concept of seat assignment with a payable upgrade option for two fare classes
In this paper, we have the following assumptions;
1. Given upgrade option sales (zi , z2, …, zN−1), option price and recall compensation are
gi , hi (gi < hi ), respectively.
2. Demands are independent of each other, and upgrades will be available only for the next
class up.
3. The number of recalls for fare class i (i ) is a random variable depending on the demand
for class (Di ).
4. Once the upgrade option is available, it will be possible to re-sell the seat by using a
waiting list for the lower fare tickets. The maximum number on the waiting list will be
charged by zi .
5. Payable upgrade options will be sold out.
Considering 2 two class products, Fig. 1 illustrates the concept of seat assignment with a
payable upgrade option. The total revenue without the payable upgrade option is defined as
follows:
R(Q) = R1(x1) + R2(x2), (x1 + x2 = Q),
R1(x1) = r1S1(x1), (S1(x1) = Min(D1, x1)),
R2(x2) = r2S2(x2), (S2(x2) = Min(D2, Q − x1)).
However, once the payable upgrade option is offered to customers, the total revenue can
be defined depending on the amount of sales of the upgrade option as well as the recalled
option. Then the total revenue can be presented as follows:
R̂(Q)=R̂1(x1) + R̂2(x2), (x1 + x2 = Q),
R̂1(x1) = r1S1(x1) + g1z1 − h11 + r2(z1 − 1), (S1(x1) = Min(D1, x1)),
R̂2(x2) = r2S2(x2), (S2(x2) = Min(D2, Q − x1)).
Then R̂(Q) can be represented as the sum of R(Q) and the additional revenue ∇R(x1).
R̂(Q) = R1(x1) + R2(x2) + ∇R(x1), (∇R(x1) = g1z1 − h11 + r2(z1 − 1)).
Hence, if ∇R(x1) > 0, the expected revenue with the payable upgrade option is greater
than that without this option.
Proposition 1 Let us consider two fare-class products and let x1, x2 be the number of assigned
seats. For any given values of z1, x1, g1, h1, the actual revenuewith a payable upgrade option




(r2+h1) is satisfied for all s1 and r2. (If a re-sale is not permitted,r2 = 0).
Proof ∇R(x1) which means that the revenue gain obtained from the payable upgrade option
is represented as the following equation.
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∇R(x1) = g1z1 − h11 + (z1 − 1)r2 = (g1 + r2)z1 − (h1 + r2)1.
We can see that if the revenue gain is positive, the revenue with a payable upgrade option
product is greater than that without the option.
Therefore, if ∇R(x1) = (g1 + r2)z1 − (h1 + r2)1 ≥ 0, we can see s1z1 ≤
(r2+g1)
(r2+h1) .
Since ∇R(x1) denotes the revenue gain from the sale of payable upgrade option products,
it represents the providers’ surplus. That is, when airlines offer payable upgrade option
products, they will have revenue gains∇R(x1) in the case of s1z1 ≤
(r2+g1)
(r2+h1) . Customer surplus
will be calculated by defining customers’ benefits from purchasing payable upgrade option
products. Customers’ benefits can be defined as three types: upgrade, compensation, and
saving. Upgrade benefit is defined as the fare difference between two fare classes with the
payable upgrade option price. The benefit will occur when it is possible for customers who
have already bought the payable upgrade option without recall to use a higher fare class.
Compensation benefit is defined as the difference between the compensation when recalled
and the price of the payable upgrade option product. Saving benefit is dependent on the
number of payable upgrades, and is defined by the fare difference between two fare classes
without an upgrade option price.
If airlines do not recall the upgrade options, customers paying (r2 + g1) including the
upgrade option can use the higher band service that is worth r1. Then, customers get the
upgrade benefit r1 − (r2 + g1). In this case, customers who were rejected for the r2 fare
service and registered on the waiting list for this service can now use the r2 fare service.
Therefore, a customer can save (r1 − r2), because if s/he cannot use the r2 fare, s/he has to
pay the r1 fare to use the service, and this is defined as the saving benefit. If airlines re-call
the option, a customer having this option receives compensation h1 from airlines, and the
compensation benefit is defined as (h1 − g1).
Given the number of the payable upgrade option z1 and the number of options re-called
1, the customer benefit CV (z1,1) denoting the customer surplus is defined as follows:
CV (z1,1) = (r1 − r2 − g1)(z1 − 1) + (h1 − g1)1 + (r1 − r2)(z1 − 1).

Proposition 2 In case of purchasing an upgrade option, there always exists a customer
surplus.
Proof In the customer benefit, we already know that the compensation (h1) for the recalled
product should be greater than the re-call option price (g1). The customers’ benefits can be
represented as follows:
CV (z1,1) = (r1 − r2 − g1)(z1 − 1) + (h1 − g1)1 + (r1 − r2)(z1 − 1)
= {2(r1 − r2) − g1}z1 − {2(r1 − r2) − h1}1
Noting that the compensation and the option price should be less than or equal to (r1−r2);
0 ≤ g1 ≤ h1 ≤ (r1 − r2). 
Then the customer surplus has a positive value, so the customer surplus existswhen airlines
offer customers a payable upgrade option.
CV (z1,1) = {2(r1 − r2) − g1}z1 − {2(r1 − r2) − h1}1
≥ {2(r1 − r2) − g1}1 − {2(r1 − r2) − h1}1
= (h1 − g1)1 ≥ 0
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Given a capacity Q, the total expected revenue (TR(Q)) will be calculated as follows:




= E[R1(x1) + R2(x2) + ∇R(x1)], (x1 + x2 = Q).









= r1{1 − F1(x1)} + dE[∇R(x1)
dx1
− r2{1 − F2(Q − x1)}.
(Fi (x1) : cumulative probability at x1 for fare class i)
Let EMR1(x1) = r1{1 − F1(x1)} + dE[∇R(x1)]dx1 and EMR2(Q − x1) =
r2{1 − F2(Q − x1)}. Then we can get the maximum revenue at point x1 with EMR1(x1) =
EMR2(Q − x1).
The number of products recalled is defined as the different value depending on the demand








0, D1 ≤ x1,
D1 − (x1 − z1), x1 − z1 ≤ D1 ≤ x1,
z1, D1 ≥ x1.
dE[∇R(x1)]
dx1
= −(h1 + r2)
d[∫x1x1−z1 (D1 − (x1 − z1)) f1(x1)dD1 + ∫∞x1 z1 f1(x1)dD1]
dx1
= −(h1 + r2){−(F1(x1) − F1(x1 − z1))} = (h1 + r2){F1(x1) − F1(x1 − z1)}.
( fi (xi ) : the probability density function of the demand for fare class i).
The expected marginal revenues EMR1(x1) and EMR2(Q − x1) can be defined as fol-
lows:
EMR1(x1) = r1{1 − F1(x1)} + (h1 + r2){F1(x1) − F1(x1 − z1)},
EMR2(Q − x1) = r2{1 − F2(Q − x1)}.
Assuming that the low fare demand comes first, the probability that the demand for r2 fare
is greater than the number of available seats (Q − x1) is equal to 1: i.e.F2(Q − x1) = 0. The
number of seats to be assigned for fare r1 can be obtained from the following equation:
EMR1(x1) = r1{1 − F1(x1)} + (h1 + r2){F1(x1) − F1(x1 − z1)} = r2.
In our model, we can find that the expected marginal revenue of fare r2 with the payable
upgrade option is relatively low compared to the value without the option. Since the expected
marginal value is decreased with the increase of seats assigned, the more seats are assigned,
the lower the marginal value. Therefore, with the payable upgrade option, more seats will be
assigned to higher fares compared to existing methods, and more revenue will be available
by inducing up-selling to higher fares with the payable upgrade option.
3.1 Example for two fares
We consider the example with two fare classes. Input parameters, including fares, option
price, compensation, demands and the number of options to be sold, are as follows:
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Then, the expected marginal revenue for fare class 1 can be obtained as follows:
EMR1(x1) = 100(1 − F1(x1)) + (60 + 15)(F1(x1) − F1(x1 − 5)).
Since the expected marginal revenue for fare class 2 is EMR2(Q − x1) = 60, the number
of assigned seats for fare class 1 is determined at 51, which is the closest between EMR1(x1)
and EMR2(Q − x1).
x1 EMR1(x1) EMR2(Q − x1) r2 Remark
45 80.39 69.15 60 – Since the expected marginal values for fare r1 and fare
r2 without the payable upgrade option are EMR1(x1)
= 61.79 and EMR2(Q − x1) = 60, respectively, the
seat assignment is determined as x1 = 47 and x2 = 53
– Since the marginal expected values for fare r1 and fare
r2 with the payable upgrade option are EMR1(x1) =
60.66 and EMR2(Q − x1) = 6 0, the numbers of
assigned seats are x1 = 51 and x2 = 49 respectively
46 77.58 65.54 60
47 74.56 61.79 60
48 71.33 57.93 60
49 67.93 53.98 60
50 64.36 50.00 60
51 60.66 46.02 60
52 56.86 42.07 60
53 53.00 38.21 60
Without the payable upgrade option, we assign 47 seats for fare r1 and 53 seats for fare
r2, and expect a total revenue of 7612.9. While, once we offer the payable upgrade option,
the assigned numbers of seats are 51 and 49 for fares r1 and r2 respectively, and the total
expected revenue will be increased to 7729.4. Therefore, we can get a revenue gain of 116.7















Option 4649.4 2939.8 50.0 − 41.85 132.0 7729.4
No-option 4433.5 3179.4 – – – 7612.9
Revenue
gain
215.9 − 239.6 50.0 − 41.85 132.0 116.7
% Gain 4.87 − 7.54 – – – 1.53
For multiple fare-classes with more than three classes, we will apply Belobaba’s (1989)
EMSR approach to assign the number of seats for each fare class. Given M fare classes











{ri Min(Di , xi ) + gi zi − hii + (zi − i )ri+1}
]
, ∇RM (xM ) = 0.
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As in the EMSR approach, we adjust the fare and the demand for higher fare classes to
determine the protection level for higher fare classes. For all fare classes greater than or equal
to fare class i, the adjusted demand D1i for the adjusted fare r1i has the distribution with an












Let K̂ be the set of all fare classes greater than or equal to fare class K , and x1K be
the number of seats assigned for the set K̂ . Let EMR1K (x1K ) be the expected marginal
revenue with x1K for the set K̂ . Then x1K is obtained at the value with EMR1K (x1K ) =
EMR1K+1(Q − x1K ) which depends on the adjusted demand for the set K̂ .
EMR1K (x1K ) = dT R1K
dx1K
= d(R1K (x1K ) + ∇R1K (x1K ))
dx1K
= d{r1K Min(D1K , x1K )}
dx1K
,
EMR1K+1(Q − x1K ) = rK+1, (∇R1K (x1K ) = g1z1 − h11 + (z1 − 1)r2).
Since x1K means the number of seats assigned for fare class set K̂ , it denotes the protection
level for fare class set K̂ . Customers who bought the product with fare class K + 1 and the
payable upgrade option are permitted to upgraded only to fare class K . The seat assignment
process for the multiple fare classes with the payable upgrade option is almost the same as
EMSR and is represented as follows:
[Step 0] The protection level for the highest service level: x1.
EMR1(x1) = EMR2(Q − x1) (= r2, as the demand for the lower service comes first).
[Step 1] For fare class i products, adjust the demand and the price for products with a higher
fare than product i; D1i , σ 1i , and r1i .
Calculate EMR1i (x1i ) for the demand distribution with the mean D1i , the variance σ 21i ,
and the price r1i . The protection level x1i is determined as the following condition:
EMR1i (x1i ) = EMRi+1(Q − x1i )(= ri+1).
When the seat assignment process is completed, we obtain the protection level for the
higher fare products. Using the protection level, the booking level BLi of fare class i is
defined as follows:
BLi = Q − x1i−1, (x11 = 0).
4 Numerical examples
There are many changes to the airline fare systems due to fierce competition in the airline
industry. A notable one is the branded fare, which is adopted in most LCCs. LCCs sell their
products with three to four branded fares instead of the traditional booking classes. In this
paper, we consider four classes to test the performance of the seat assignment for the multiple
fare classes. For convenience, we assume the input parameters that are given in Table 1. The
total capacity Q is assumed as 200, and we assume that demand is normally distributed.
For the performance evaluation, we measure the revenue gain obtained from the seat
assignment with the payable upgrade option by comparing it to the revenue for the seat
assignment without the option. We calculate the expected revenues from three different
123
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Table 1 Input parameters






1 100 5 5 10 30 5
2 80 5 10 15 50 10
3 60 5 15 20 80 10
4 30 5 – – 100 20
models: Model 1 for seat assignment with the payable upgrade option, Model 2 for the
payable upgrade option sale after the seat assignment without the payable upgrade option,
and Model 3 for seat assignment without the payable upgrade option.
The seat assignments for fare classes in our example are given in Table 2.
Given the total capacity of 200 and applying protective nesting, the booking limit and the
protection level for each fare class are shown in Table 3. It shows that more seats are assigned
to the higher-class fares. The expected revenue for each model is given in Table 4.
In Model 1, for the given 200 seats, the average number of seats sold is 192.2. Among the
total 15 recall options, we can see that 8.1 seats are recalled and 6.9 seats are upgraded to
Table 2 Protection levels
Assigned number of seats* Expected marginal revenues
x1 30 (26) EMR1(x1)=100(1-F1(x1)) + (80 +
10)(F1(x1)-F1(x1 − 5)), EMR2(Q − x1)= 80
x12 79 (75) D12=80, σ̃12=
√
125, and r12= (100 × 30 + 80 × 50)/80
= 87.5
EMR12(x12)= 87.5(1-F12(x12)) + (60 +
15)(F12(x12)-F12(x12 − 5)), EMR3(Q − x12)=60
x13 167 (164) D13=160, σ̃13=
√
225, r13=(100 × 30 + 80 × 50 + 60 ×
80)/160 = 73.75
EMR13(x13)=73.75(1-F13(x13)) + (30 +
20)(F13(x13)-F13(x13 − 5)), EMR4(Q − x13) = 30
*(): the number of seats assigned without the payable upgrade option
Table 3 Seat assignment and








1 (100) 30 (26) 30 (26) 200 (200)
2 (80) 49 (49) 79 (75) 170 (174)
3 (60) 88 (89) 167 (164) 121 (125)
4 (30) 33 (36) 0 (0) 33 (36)
*(): the number of seats assigned without the payable upgrade option
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higher class fare products. The total expected revenue is 12,538.9. In Model 3, without the
payable upgrade option, we can expect the average number of seats sold to be 185.9 and the
expected revenue is 11,999.7, which is less than that of Model 1. This means that Model 1
can achieve a 4.5% revenue gain compared to Model 3. Even in Model 2, we find a revenue
gain compared to Model 3. It is expected from the proposition 1. Compared to Model 2, the
revenue gain of ourmodel (Model 1) is expected to be 2.0% in the total revenue.Consequently,
in our simple model, it is proven that once airlines offer their customers payable upgrade
options, these options contribute to the increase in revenue. Furthermore, we can see that
managing seat control by considering the recall process will lead to a significant revenue
gain for airlines.
5 Conclusion
Airlines operate complex RM systems to increase revenues with various fare classes. How-
ever, with the advent of ancillary services, airlines are paying more attention to increasing
revenues from developing additional services instead of traditional sales of full packaged
services. Callable options or similar ones have been popular for increasing revenues. The
payable upgrade option suggested in this paper is an innovative and novel service. Unlike the
callable options, customers are guaranteed to be able to use the services even if their upgrade
options are recalled by the airlines. In this paper, we showed that the payable upgrade options
increase airlines’ revenue to manage demand uncertainty.
We showed that the payable upgrade option will generate more revenue if sizi ≤
(ri+1+gi )
(ri+1+hi )
is guaranteed. Furthermore, applying Belobaba’s EMSR approach (1989), we suggested an
effective seat assignment method for multiple fare classes with the payable upgrade option
to increase total revenue. With a numerical example, we found that the revenue can be
increased by introducing a payable upgrade option. If airlines sell payable upgrade options
as an ancillary service, they can achieve a 2.0% revenue gain. That is, if we consider a
payable upgrade option sale, it is effective to allocate more seats to the higher fare classes
and to induce service upgrades via payable upgrade options for the customers whose first
priority is for the lower fare classes.
The findings of this study make the following contributions. Firstly, the paper contributes
to the RM literature by proposing an analytical model for a payable upgrade option service.
We identified the properties of the upgrade option model and proved its positive performance
in the presence of demand uncertainties. Secondly, the findings of the paper provide a clear
practical implication for airlines to introduce a payable upgrade option product in their
portfolios. Our method for allocating seats for multiple fare classes with a payable upgrade
option will contribute effectively to the revenue increase in airlines’ branded fare products
and can also be applied by companies in other service industries, including hotels, car rentals
and restaurants.
However, before applying our model to real-world practice, it needs further studies on
consumers’ behavioural analysis regardingwaiting time to be recalled, the number of payable
upgrade options to sell, and the prices for the various options. Furthermore, it is important to
analyse customers’ emotional response to payable upgrade options. The analysis should be
extended to examine the effect of cancellation and no-show behaviour. This paper pioneers
a stream of such studies in the area.
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